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CHAPTER 128
Workers' Compensation
Nicholas A. Ashford
At the turn of the century, pressure began to mount to
shift the impact of occupational injury from the worker to
the employer and society in general. This pressure came
both from increased numbers of successful lawsuits
brought by workers against employers for injuries suf-
fered on the job and from increased public awareness that
an unfair burden was being placed on workers as the
country began a new period of industrialization. The first
workers' compensation laws were passed by nine states in
191 1, and most of the remaining states quickly followed.
At the time these laws were enacted, occupational disease
was considered a far less pressing problem than injury. It
was not until 1917 that Massachusetts and California
became the first states to compensate occupational dis-
ease. Unfortunately, it took until 1976 for all 50 states to
have some form of occupational disease coverage (1),
although that coverage fell far short of addressing most of
the serious job-related health problems (2-6).
The primary purpose of a workers' compensation sys-
tem is to cover the costs of medical care and rehabilita-
tion and to provide compensation for lost wages resulting
from workplace illness and injury. The agreement
embodied in the state programs is that the employee relin-
quishes the right to sue an employer for damages in return
for fair and timely compensation for occupational injury.
To receive compensation, the worker need not prove
employer negligence but only that the injury or illness
was caused by the job. Most states limit compensation to
two-thirds of previous wages and cover all medical costs
(2).
Within each state program, three fundamental provi-
sions characterize the operation of the compensation pro-
grams: first, all worker claims are handled by the state
compensation boards; second, the insurer is entitled to
contest permanent disability claims; and third, in any con-
tested case the burden of persuasion is on the worker (7).
These provisions establish a one-sided, no-fault system
that sometimes operates to the detriment of workers (5,8).
In addition to rapid and fair compensation, workers'
compensation programs have two other objectives. One is
to internalize the cost of workplace disease and injury so
that employers will bear the burden of maintaining haz-
ardous workplaces and have an incentive to improve job
safety and health conditions. The other objective is to
mitigate the costs to a single employer of a catastrophic
financial loss by spreading the risk through an insurance
pool. These three goals of the workers' compensation sys-
tem work somewhat at cross-purposes.
Employers avoid major catastrophic costs through risk
spreading, which is accomplished in three ways. The
largest firms, which constitute about 1% of employers
and 10% to 15% of employees, are self-insured. Risk
spreading is accomplished in these firms because of the
large number of employees. The smallest firms, consti-
tuting 85% of employers and 15% of employees, are class
rated. Class rating sets a payroll tax deduction based on
industry illness and injury history. The third mechanism
used by the remainder of firms, which constitute 14% of
employers and about 70% of employees, is experience
rating, which is class rating further adjusted to individual
experience (9). While these mechanisms promote the
goal of risk spreading, they impair attainment of the goal
of internalization of injury and illness costs. Since, in
most cases, the full cost of disease and injury does not
fall on an individual employer, risk spreading, in fact,
removes a considerable portion of the incentive to
improve job health and safety (2).
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Even if the risk spreading effects of the insurance sys-
tem did not weaken the employer's impetus to improve
job health and safety conditions, little actual incentive
exists for an employer to internalize the costs of harm of
chronic occupational disease. The employer faces a
choice: reduce health hazards today or pay compensation
costs 20 to 30 years from now. The cost of capital-the
interest-earning capacity of money-makes it economi-
cally attractive to avoid compliance costs today, even if
higher workers' compensation benefits, measured in
nominal terms, might have to be paid decades later. If the
costs of workers' compensation were the only incentive
an employer faced, the employer would probably profit
by postponing preventive measures to improve health and
safety.
This chapter reviews some of the inequities arising
from variations among state systems and discusses
efforts to ameliorate them. General trends and costs of
workers' compensation programs, the problems of occu-
pational disease coverage, and alternative mechanisms
for compensating occupationally diseased victims are
also examined.
INEQUITIES AND STATE VARIATIONS
Prompted by the 1972 study of the National Commis-
sion on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, the 1976
Democratic platform promised nationwide minimum
standards for workers' compensation programs. The
national commission, composed of representatives from
labor, industry, and state and federal governments, inves-
tigated the status of compensation programs in all 50
states and issued a unanimous report calling for 84 revi-
sions in state systems (10).
Among the problems the commission found were that
many employees had no coverage at all; occupational dis-
eases were not covered adequately; there were arbitrary
limits on medical and physical rehabilitation services, as
well as on the duration or total amount of benefits; there
were inadequate cash benefits for temporary, permanent,
total, and partial disabilities and for death dependents;
coverage of work-related diseases with latency periods
was limited by filing restrictions; and in some cases, fil-
ing jurisdictions were unclear and provided very different
compensation schedules. The commission specified 19
changes that they considered essential. Their report con-
cluded that the states should be given some time to
straighten out their programs but that Congress should
act by 1975 if all states had not then resolved the most
severe problems of workers' compensation.
In the years since the national commission's report,
many states have updated, expanded, and improved their
programs. These improvements have included expanded
coverage to all employees, longer periods for filing
claims, full medical benefits for occupational disease,
and broader representation of labor's concerns as
reflected in the composition of the state compensation
boards. While the states' record of compliance with the
commission's 19 essential recommendations has clearly
shown improvement (an average compliance score of
12.7 out of 19.0 in 1992 compared with 6.8 in 1972),
most gains (12.0) had already been achieved by 1980
(11). As of 1988, only some 30 states were in full com-
pliance, and the commission's chairman expressed his
continued disappointment, concluding "the quest for
adequate workers' compensation benefits is far from
over" (12).
In recent years, many states have further increased
workers' compensation benefits. Nevertheless, workers'
compensation benefits still vary significantly among the
states. For instance, in 1995, the maximum state benefits
for both temporary total disability and permanent total
disability ranged from $817 in Iowa to S253 in Missis-
sippi (13). In 29 jurisdictions, permanent total disability
payments were at least 100% of the state's average wage,
although in 10 states the payments were no more than
75% of the average wage (13). Although the differences
among states in workers' compensation benefits paid to
workers have narrowed significantly in recent years (as
measured by benefits paid per 100,000 workers), it
appears that the primary cause is a substantial reduction
in benefits paid by the more generous states rather than
an increase in benefits paid by the less generous states
(14).
Since 1976, members of Congress have sought to
renew the promise of fair and adequate coverage for
occupational injury and disease through the imposition
of nationwide standards. Characteristically, labor and
employers have found themselves on opposite sides of
this issue. Labor has vigorously supported nationwide
standards as a way to remove the inequities and injus-
tices of the current program, and employers have tended
to believe that states can resolve the problems without
national interference (9). In the past few years, after
escalating costs and inadequate benefits, labor, manage-
ment, and insurers have all been calling for major
reforms (15).
In the past, consensus for a federal solution was
reached only after a work-related disease became a press-
ing problem for industry, and then the solution typically
involved the federal government's absorbing most of the
compensation costs. The black lung program is a promi-
nent example.
TRENDS AND COSTS IN COVERAGE
Although workers' compensation programs are sup-
posed to provide coverage for all workers, the national
commission found that 15% of the 1972 work force was
not covered. By 1980 the percentage of uncovered work-
ers declined to around 10% (16). Workers who are not
covered include casual workers, some small business
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workers, domestic workers, farm workers, self-employed
workers, and state and local government workers.
It is estimated that in 1978 there were 7.8 million
workers' compensation awards in the following cate-
gories:
Medical payments
Temporary disability benefits
Partial disability benefits
Permanent total disability benefits
Death benefits '
6 million
1.3 million
0.42 million
2,600
7,800
Although the incidence of occupational injuries and
illnesses originally declined after the passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, from 10.9
cases per 100 workers in 1972 to 7.6 cases per 100 work-
ers in 1983, it has edged up in recent years, to 8.9 cases
per 100 workers in 1992 (17). Even more troubling is the
fact that, per 100 workers, the rate of injuries involving
time lost from work-injuries that are presumptively
more severe-has increased by approximately 20%
between 1972 and 1992, and the average time lost as a
result of these injuries has steadily increased over the
period, by approximately 65% in total (6,17).
The fastest growing category of occupational disease,
by far, has been musculoskeletal problems resulting from
cumulative or repetitive trauma, such as carpal tunnel
syndrome (6). Of the 368,000 new cases of occupational
disease reported by employers in 1991, some 61% were
cumulative or repetitive trauma cases, up from 18% in
1981 (18). In that year, musculoskeletal disorders
accounted for 43% of all occupational injuries and ill-
nesses reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (18).
Ignoring musculoskeletal disorders, only 5% of occu-
pational diseases are covered by workers' compensation
programs (16), and occupational disease accounts for
only about 1% of all workers' compensation claims (15).
The costs of workers' compensation have been escalat-
ing since the national commission's report and the subse-
quent state efforts to improve programs. In 1970, total
costs were about $4.9 billion; by 1978, costs had esca-
lated to $15.8 billion. This increase was due to inflation
in medical costs as well as to improvements in coverage.
At the same time that payments were increasing by more
than threefold, workers' compensation costs as a percent-
age of payroll increased by 62%, from 1.11% to 1.80%;
60% of premiums were paid out in compensation, and
40% were used to pay overhead, legal fees, and to provide
a cash surplus for insurance carriers (16).
After the mid- 1980s workers' compensation insurance
costs were driven by rising medical expenses rather than
by rising cash benefits for workers (15). From 1990 to
1993 alone, the medical component of workers' compen-
sation benefits increased from 40.9% of total workers'
compensation benefits to 50% (6). By 1993, workers'
compensation programs cost $57.3 billion, up from $25.1
billion in 1984, and the share of costs paid out in com-
pensation had increased to 73% (19,20). Meanwhile,
workers' compensation costs as a percentage of payroll
rose to a peak of 2.40% in 1991 and then dipped back
slightly to 2.30% in 1993 (20).
Theoretically, uworkers' compensation payments are
intended to provide for two-thirds wage replacement in
individual cases. In reality, however, they do not operate
this way. Total lost income for occupational disease was
estimated to be around S11.4 billion for 1978, and since
at most 3% of the $15.8 billion awarded in 1978 was for
work-related disease, nearly $11 billion of lost wages was
not compensated by workers' compensation programs. If
one considers all sources of compensation, only 40% of
the earnings lost because of disease is compensated in
individual cases, and only 5% of the compensation is pro-
vided by workers' compensation programs. The remain-
der comes from Social Security, welfare, pensions, veter-
ans' benefits, and private insurance.
Work-related injuries are covered at a rate of about
60%, the majority of this compensation coming from
workers' compensation programs (16). The total compen-
sation from all sources for wages lost from work-related
injuries averages around 60%. In 1980, for workers
totally disabled by disease, the average lifetime compen-
sation in individual cases was $9,700, which is 12.6% of
the $77,000 they would normally have expected in
adjusted lifetime earnings (16). In very few individual
cases does the compensation meet the two-thirds wages
goal, and the aggregate figures show an even more dismal
picture.
Among the reasons for failure of state programs to
cover occupational disease and injury adequately are
these:
Payments are subject to low ceilings.
No cost-of-living increases are provided.
Payments for severe permanent disability are lower than
those for temporary disability.
There are restrictions on medical care services and total
amounts compensated.
Nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, are
never compensated.
Many occupational diseases are not covered at all.
Ten percent of all workers are excluded from coverage.
An additional complicating factor is that compensation
is based on the extent of disability as judged by physi-
cians. This arrangement sets up a contest between the
worker and employer to find physicians who will provide
the most desired judgments.
PROBLEMS IN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
COVERAGE
The problems are most severe for occupational disease
coverage. Workers' compensation programs did not orig-
inally cover work-related diseases, and in 1972 only 41
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states provided a reasonable range of coverage. Even
today, 21 states limit occupational disease coverage to
diseases that are peculiar to or characteristic of a worker's
occupation, subject to review by the state workers' com-
pensation boards.
Injuries resulting from accidents were the focus of the
original workers' compensation systems. The "risk of
the accident had to be peculiar to employment or not
common to the general public" (21). When the states
expanded their coverage to include occupational dis-
ease, they often changed the language so that the dis-
ease itself and not the risk of the disease was covered.
As a result, in many cases, coverage is limited to dis-
eases peculiar to the occupation and ordinary diseases
of life are excluded, whatever their cause. This restric-
tion effectively eliminates coverage for much occupa-
tionally related disease.
The burden of persuasion for establishing the connec-
tion between workplace conditions and disability is also
more difficult to meet with occupational disease (8). Ill-
ness, particularly cancer and other chronic diseases, often
develops many years after exposure and is not usually
traceable to exposure in the workplace.
The distinctions between disease and accident com-
pensation are striking. Sixty percent of all disease claims
are initially denied, while only 10% of accident claims
receive the same treatment (5,8). In addition, there is
more than a 1-year average delay in any compensation for
disease victims when it is awarded. Furthermore, work-
related disease claims are typically burdened by signifi-
cant litigation costs; legal assistance is required for 77%
of all disease claims but only 24% of all injury claims.
Compensation also varies; in 1980 survivor death bene-
fits averaged $3,500 for disease victims and $57,500 for
injury victims. Finally, workers' compensation claims are
contested at an average rate of 60% for respiratory dis-
ease, 55% for heart ailments, and only 10% for accidents
(5,1 1). The majority of uncontested compensated disease
claims are for minor ailments or problems readily appar-
ent as workplace induced (16).
As stated earlier, ordinary diseases of life are usually
excluded from coverage. These include infectious dis-
eases, many heart ailments, and many diseases with a
work-related element. Work-related diseases are not gen-
erally covered by workers' compensation for several rea-
sons. One reason is that very often occupational diseases
have multiple causes, and it is therefore difficult to trace
the cause to the workplace. A second reason is that many
diseases have a long latency period, which tends to
obscure the precise cause of the disease and the exact
place of employment where critical exposure occurred.
Problems of multiple causation and latency are com-
pounded by statutes of limitations that apply to claims in
most states (5). There are, in addition, jurisdictional prob-
lems with disease victims who have changed jobs during
the period when the disease was developing. Moreover,
many states have set minimum exposure requirements; a
worker must be exposed for a specific time period before
a disease can be attributed to an occupational cause (21).
Finally, a major reason that work-related diseases are not
covered by workers' compensation is that workers and
medical personnel often do not recognize that a disease
results from workplace exposure. They therefore neglect
to investigate a particular workplace or occupation as a
potential source of disease.
Cancer and respiratory tract disease compensation
deficiencies continue to be a critical problem today. To
obtain compensation for occupationally induced cancer,
workers must prove that the disease is work related, and
the standard of proof for this demonstration is difficult to
meet (8). The courts have accepted some cancers as occu-
pationally induced-mesothelioma caused by asbestos,
leukemia caused by benzene, and angiosarcoma of the
liver caused by vinyl chloride are three that are increas-
ingly recognized-but other job-related cancers, such as
asbestos-induced lung cancer, are less readily accepted,
especially if the worker also happens to have been a
smoker. In meeting the standard of proof for causation,
animal models are not sufficient demonstration that a
cancer is occupationally related. Only one of every 79
persons who dies of occupational cancer in the United
States receives workers' compensation (8).
Even a nonneoplastic respiratory tract disease such as
byssinosis (brown lung) is, for compensation purposes,
barely recognized as occupationally related, even though
studies of textile workers leave little doubt about the con-
tribution ol cotton-dust exposure to byssinosis.
Self-insured employers are subject to the largest losses
from successful claims, and they contest at a higher rate
than other employers. From the viewpoint of employers the
stakes are high: permanent disability from occupational
disease accounts for only 5% of the claims but 50% of the
costs. To the extent that insurance carriers respond to pres-
sure from employers to keep payouts and, hence, premiums
at a minimum, occupational disease will continue to be
excluded as much as possible. It is also true that insurance
carriers (especially noncompetitive carriers) who operate
more or less on a percentage-of-cash-flow basis do face a
counterincentive to include occupational disease in order
to increase profits. Why, then, is there so much resistance?
The answer probably lies in the fact that the occupational
disease problem is already large and threatens to become
larger (given the history of exposure to harmful sub-
stances) and in the great uncertainty involved in setting
premium payments for disease. The prospect of large,
uncertain payouts in the future would discourage any sub-
stantial increase in scheduled payouts for diseases.
In sum, significant scientific, legal, and economic bar-
riers exist to the incorporation of occupational disease
into the workers' compensation system. Other avenues to
make the victim whole must be pursued, at least as sup-
plements to the currently inadequate state programs.
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ALTERNATIVE COVERAGE FOR
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
There are two additional means by which workers can
obtain payments for general occupational disease. In
1980 the Social Security Disability Income Insurance
Program provided 53% of the compensation to occupa-
tional respiratory disease victims, and it was their major
provider of relief (16). Occupational disease costs this
program about $2.2 billion annually, and 47% of all dis-
ease-afflicted workers received some form of compensa-
tion. Although Social Security compensation is low, it is
substantially easier to obtain than workers' compensa-
tion: 83.6% of all claims are allowed on initial applica-
tion (16). Nevertheless, workers often do encounter diffi-
culties under the Social Security program, including
5-month delays in payment, restrictions on recency of
employment, and 2-year delays in Medicare coverage.
The second means is third-party liability suits brought
in the state and federal courts. These are suits brought
against manufacturers of harmful substances that an
employee uses in the workplace. Workers are generally
prevented from suing their employers directly, unless the
employer is also the manufacturer. Through this system,
workers are able to bring suits against manufacturers or
suppliers one step back in the process. Conversely,
employers who purchased the harmful substances for use
in the workplace may be able to sue manufacturers for the
costs of employee compensation.
Although third-party suits are costly for employees,
they are appealing because they provide compensation for
lost wages, disfigurement, medical and legal expenses,
and pain and suffering. On average, the possible awards
are much higher than standard workers' compensation
claims.
Product liability suits can be brought for three major
causes: manufacturing defects, design defects, and inad-
equate warnings. To receive recovery, a worker must
show an injury, a manufacturing or design defect, and a
causal link between the two.
A manufacturer can use the following defenses in the
negligence suit: contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and misuse of the product. For a suit brought under
a breach of warranty, a manufacturer may use the
assumption of risk and misuse of the product. However,
in such cases, "defendants usually escape liability only
when the plaintiff assumes the risk by voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger"
(21).
At one time, product liability suits were the greatest
concern to machine tool manufacturers and were con-
fined to injury claims. Because of the reduction in third-
party liability problems that would accompany national
standards, machine tool manufacturers are now one of the
few industrial groups that support national workers' com-
pensation standards. The use of third-party liability suits
in disease claims is well established in the asbestos expo-
sure area and is now being tested in other areas of chem-
ical exposure. The courts have been considering several
issues with respect to worker suits: the producer's aware-
ness of effects, the severity of effects, the user's assump-
tion of risk, and the technological feasibility of instruc-
tions and warnings. Unfortunately, a number of factors
also limit recovery under this system, including statutes
of limitation and the expense and time involved in obtain-
ing recovery through private legal action. These suits are
most successful where the link between exposure to a
harmful substance and occupational disease is acknowl-
edged as a matter of science or medical knowledge. In
cases where the link is weak or allegedly complicated by
other possible causes, such as smoking or drinking,
recovery in the courts meets the same obstacle it does in
the workers' compensation system-the problem of
causality. Advances in epidemiology, biologic markers
(22), and improved diagnoses by physicians are essential
to the recognition of occupational disease in both sys-
tems.
In addition to the aforementioned programs to provide
payment to victims of occupational disease in general,
systems may be designed for a specific disease. An exam-
ple is the black lung compensation system enacted by
Congress in 1977. This system operates as a no-fault
mechanism to award those suffering from black lung with
compensation and medical care in lieu of state workers'
compensation benefits. This substance-by-substance
approach arises after a problem has reached crisis magni-
tude, and it relies on a public bailout of the associated
industries. While satisfying the social goal of compensat-
ing workers, it provides little incentive for prevention of
future harm from new hazards.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Compensation for occupational disease will, unfortu-
nately, continue to be a problem that is addressed inad-
equately by state workers' compensation systems. The
Social Security system will probably continue to pro-
vide assistance to occupationally diseased workers. In
terms of specific diseases, workers' compensation sys-
tems will never cover the myriad adverse health effects
caused by exposure to chemicals in general. Minimum
federal compensation standards would improve the situ-
ation for many workers, and private lawsuits may bene-
fit others. However, by and large, since causality
remains a difficult problem, most occupational diseases
will, sadly, not be paid for by the employer, by the con-
sumer of that employer's products, or by manufacturers
of harmful substances (5). Instead, the public and the
worker will continue to bear the burden. These consid-
erations are one more reason why a strong federal regu-
latory effort to limit worker exposure to toxic sub-
stances is needed.
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